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ARGUMENT 
I. The Utah Public Utility Code Does Not Give the Public Service Commission 
Jurisdiction Over Governmental Entities, Such As Heber Light & Power 
Company. 
In this appeal, the issue is whether the Commission erred by asserting jurisdiction 
over a governmental entity, such as HLP. It is axiomatic that the Commission has only 
the jurisdiction granted by statute and such grants are narrowly construed. Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995). The 
utility code does not grant the Commission jurisdiction over governmental entities and 
excludes governmental entities from Commission jurisdiction. Thus, the Commission 
lacks jurisdiction. 
Faced with the absence of a statutory grant of jurisdiction, the Commission and 
RMP ask the Court to rewrite the utility code to give the Commission jurisdiction over 
governmental entities. Such a ruling would make governmental entities public utilities, 
subject not only to the Commission's adjudicatory jurisdiction but to the full range of 
Commission regulation. Nothing in the utility code remotely suggests that the Legislature 
intended such a fundamental and far-reaching extension of Commission's general 
jurisdiction. To the contrary, when the Legislature has acted on jurisdiction, it has 
excluded governmental entities from Commission jurisdiction. 
The Commission and RMP discuss at length the law on a municipality's authority 
to serve. Commission Brief at 15-26, RMP Brief at 20-22, 36. This discussion however is 
1 
irrelevant because it confuses the issue of whether the Commission has jurisdiction over 
HLP with the issue of whether HLP has exceeded its authority to serve. The Commission 
and RMP mistakenly assume that the Commission has jurisdiction if a governmental 
entity, such as HLP, has exceeded its authority to serve. Commission Order at 20. (R.34). 
However, no statute gives the Commission jurisdiction over a governmental entity, even 
if the governmental entity has allegedly exceeded its authority to serve. Absent such a 
statute, the Commission lacks jurisdiction even if the governmental entity has exceeded 
its authority. 
To distract the Court from the lack of statutory authority, the Commission and 
RMP seek to characterize HLP as a scofflaw which admits to selling non-surplus power 
in violation its authority. They further raise the specter of a municipality claiming the 
"right to serve customers anywhere in Utah," RMP Brief at 36, or the right "to engage in 
the retail sale of electronic devices and appliances to customers throughout the Sate of 
Utah." Commission Brief at 24-25. This hyperbole is misleading because HLP has never 
admitted to selling non-surplus power nor claimed an unrestricted right to serve 
throughout the State of Utah. Moreover, it is prepared, in the proper forum, to present 
the law and the facts to support its continued operations. 
The real issue is whether the Commission or district court has jurisdiction to 
determine the extent of a governmental entity's authority to provide service. No one 
questions that the district court has the jurisdiction to decide these issues and to prevent 
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the parade of horrors suggested by the Commission and RMP. The Commission, 
however, has not been granted this jurisdiction and its decision must be reversed. 
A. The Commission's Orders In The Instant Case and In White City 
Acknowledge That No Statute Gives The Commission Jurisdiction 
Over Governmental Entities. 
The Commission has no jurisdiction, except for jurisdiction affirmatively granted 
by statute. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc., 901 P.2d at 1021. Any statutory 
grant of authority is narrowly construed and "any reasonable doubt of the existence of any 
power [of the Commission] must be resolved against the exercise thereof." Id. at 1021. 
"Without clear statutory authority, the commission cannot pursue even worthy objectives 
for the public good." Mountain States Tel and Tel Co. v. Public Service Com 'n, 754 
P.2d 928, 933 (Utah 1988). 
Even though the Commission's jurisdiction depends on a statutory grant of 
authority, the Commission Order does not identify the section of the utility code 
purportedly giving it jurisdiction over a governmental entity. The Commission Order 
does obliquely state, without reference to a statute, that "it seems the legislature intended 
[HLP] would be considered a corporation, association etc." Commission Order at 20 (R. 
34). It however does not justify this conclusion in light of the code's exclusion of 
governmental entities from the definition of corporation. 
The Commission Order acknowledges that "the Legislature [has] explicitly failed 
to speak on subject" of whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over a 
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municipality's service outside its municipal boundaries. Commission Order at 19-20. 
(R.34). This finding is consistent with the Commission's earlier ruling, in In re White 
City Water Company,\33 P.U.R. 4th 62 (Utah P.S.C. 1992), where the Commission 
acknowledged that "there may be no explicit statutory authority for us to assume 
jurisdiction" over extra-territorial service. Id. at 65, 67. 
RMP takes significant umbrage at the characterization of this lack of explicit 
statutory authority as a "gap" in the Commission's statutory jurisdiction. RMP Brief at 32-
33. RMP however does not dispute that the Commission acknowledged that the 
Commission lacked an explicit statutory grant of authority over governmental entities 
providing extraterritorial service. Whether this lack of authority is called a "gap" or 
something else does not change the substance of the Commission's acknowledgment that 
no statute explicitly grants it jurisdiction over governmental entities providing 
extraterritorial service and does not change the fact that the Commission rewrote the 
statute to fill this lack of an explicit statutory grant of jurisdiction. 
B. HLP is not a Person subject to Commission Jurisdiction. 
Although not the basis of the Commission Order, RMP defends the Commission 
Order by claiming that HLP is a "person" subject to Commission jurisdiction. The term 
"person," however, was amended in 1989 to remove governmental entities from the 
meaning of person subject to Commission jurisdiction. In addition, including 
governmental entities in the definition of person conflicts with other statutory sections of 
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the utility code and creates absurd results. For these reasons, HLP is not a person subject 
to Commission jurisdiction. 
1. The Term "Person" Does Not Include Governmental Entities Because 
the Legislature Removed Governmental Entities From the Definition 
of "Person" in its 1989 Amendment to the Utility Code. 
When the Legislature has dealt with governmental entities, per se, the Legislature 
has excluded governmental entities from Commission's general jurisdiction. First, it 
expressly excluded governmental entities from the definition of a "corporation" subject to 
the Commission's general jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(5). Second, it removed 
governmental entities from the definition of "person" subject to the Commission's 
general jurisdiction. Each of these Legislative actions establishes an unambiguous intent 
to exclude governmental entities from the Commission's general jurisdiction.1 
Of controlling significance is the 1989 Amendment removing governmental 
entities from the definition of "person." Simply stated, before the amendment the term 
"person" included governmental entities and made them subject to Commission 
jurisdiction, and after it did not. Thus, the 1989 Amendment precludes a finding that 
HLP, a governmental entity, is a "person," subject to Commission jurisdiction. 
1
 Conversely, when the Legislature has intended for the Commission to have 
specific jurisdiction over governmental entities, it has had no trouble clearly stating that 
intent. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 10-18-303(2)(d)(municipal cable television 
service provider shall comply with Commission rules); § 11-13-304(1 )(project entity 
required to obtain certificate from Commission); § 17B-2a-406(l)(improvement district 
providing electric service is a public utility subject to Commission jurisdiction). 
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RMP argues that the Court should rely on Legislative history to modify the 
unambiguous language of the 1989 Amendment. Legislative history, however, cannot be 
used to vary the 1989 Amendment's unambiguous expression of Legislative intent. In re 
Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589, 598 K 25 (Utah 2003). The Legislative history is thus 
irrelevant and must be disregarded. 
Assuming arguendo that the Legislative history should be considered, the 
Legislative history merely confirms the Legislature's intent to exclude governmental 
entities from the Commission's jurisdiction. The Legislative history explains that, in 
1985, the Legislature put governmental entities into the definition of "person" and thus 
potentially subject to all provisions of the utility code including the Commission's general 
jurisdiction. The Legislative intent in 1985 was only "to make sure governmental entities 
. . . could become electrical co-generators under the Federal PURPA Act." The 
Legislature had not intended to make governmental entities a "person" with respect to the 
other provisions of the utility code. 
According to this Legislative history, the 1989 Amendment corrected this mistake 
by removing governmental entities from the definition of "person" subject to the 
Commission general jurisdiction, and making a governmental entity a "person" only in 
"the special definition of person for co-generation purposes." Thus, the Legislature 
intended, as the 1989 Amendment states, that a governmental entity would not be a 
"person," subject to the Commission's general jurisdiction. 
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Notwithstanding this clear statement of Legislative intent, RMP asserts that the 
1989 Amendment and Legislative history show that "the Legislature did not intend the 
1989 Amendment to foreclose the Commission's regulation of a governmental entity" 
that provided exterritorial service. RMP Brief dX 26-27. It is however immaterial that the 
1989 Amendment does not preclude the Commission from asserting jurisdiction over 
governmental entities or is silent on the question. In order for the Commission to have 
'subject matter jurisdiction, the statute must affirmatively grant the Commission 
jurisdiction over governmental entities. The 1989 Amendment contains no such grant 
since it was intended to preclude Commission jurisdiction over governmental entities. 
In addition, RMP's argument is contradicted by the plain language of 1989 
Amendment or Legislative history. Both unambiguously preclude Commission general 
jurisdiction over governmental entities, as persons, without restriction and regardless of 
what the governmental entity is doing. In essence, RMP would re-write the 1989 
Amendment to provide that governmental entities are persons, subject to Commission 
jurisdiction, if they are allegedly acting beyond their authority. Neither the 1989 
Amendment nor its Legislative history contain any language giving the Commission 
jurisdiction over governmental entities that exceed their authority. 
In support of its argument on legislative history, RMP cites the Commission's 
decision in In re: White City Water, 133 P.U.R. 4th 62 (Utah PSC 1992). RMP Brief at 26. 
White City's entire discussion of this issue is three sentences, one of which is a reference 
? 
to an attachment containing the legislative history. Id. at 65. The decision does not, as it 
must, identify a statutory ambiguity that justifies using the legislative history as an aid to 
statutory interpretation. 
RMP's reliance on White City is also misplaced because the Commission did not 
rely on the Legislative history or White City in its Order in the instant case or in its brief 
in this appeal. The Commission, thus, has apparently abandoned the White City analysis 
and its holding on Commission jurisdiction over governmental entities. 
2. The Plain Language of the Utility Code Excludes Governmental 
Entities, Such as HLP, From the Definition of "Person," Subject to 
Commission Jurisdiction. 
The 1989 Amendment, standing alone, establishes the Legislature's intent to 
exclude governmental entities from the definition of "person," and thus from the 
Commission's jurisdiction. This conclusion is also supported by the plain language of the 
statutory definition of "person." 
The utility code defines "person" as including "corporation," "association," and 
"company." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2. The definitions of these terms overlap and contain 
common elements. For example, the term "corporation" is defined to include 
"association." Because of this interrelationship, these terms must be interpreted together 
and cannot be considered in isolation. This interrelationship also shows the Legislative 
intent that these terms refer to entities of the same character. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
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County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977).2 
RMP disparages HLP's arguments on these interrelated terms as circular, but 
provides no justification for this label. RMP Brief at 24, 25. HLP's analysis is not 
circular and simply traces the definitional path created by the Legislature. HLP applies 
the plain meaning of the statutory language in light of the other statutory provisions using 
identical terms. By considering these related provisions together, this approach obtains a 
meaning consistent with the language of each provision and avoids the absurd result of 
identical terms having different means in different sections of the same statute. 
RMP ignores this interrelationship and attempts to define the terms "association" 
and "company," in isolation from each other and from the definition of "corporation." 
This results in definitions which conflict with the statute's plain meaning and which 
cannot be consistently applied throughout the statute. 
(i) HLP is Not a Corporation Subject to Commission 
Jurisdiction. 
HLP is an energy services interlocal entity and as such a body corporate. Utah 
Code Ann. § 11-13-203(1 )(b). As a body corporate, it has the attributes of a corporation. 
56 Am.Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 1. The code however expressly excludes 
governmental entities from the definition of corporations subject to Commission 
2
 The doctrine of noscitur a sociis (known from its associates) provides "that 
the phrase, "or subdivision thereof following the words "the state, or any county" should 
be taken to mean public entities of similar character; and thus a subdivision of either the 
state or any county." Id. at 741. 
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jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(5)(b). Thus, even though HLP is a body corporate 
and a corporation, the utility code excludes HLP, a governmental entity from jurisdiction. 
Because the utility code expressly excludes governmental entities from 
corporations subject to Commission jurisdiction, RMP seeks to force HLP into the 
definition of person by characterizing HLP as an "association" or a "company." 
(ii) HLP is Not an "Association." 
RMP urges the Court to adopt a dictionary definition for the term "association," 
subject to Commission jurisdiction. Under RMP's definition, an "association" means a 
"gathering of people for a common purpose; the persons so joined." RMP Brief dA 25. 
Based on this definition, RMP concludes that HLP is an association because it "was 
created by three municipalities, associating themselves for a common purpose of 
providing electrical power." RMP Brief dX 25. RMP thus concludes that the Commission 
has jurisdiction over HLP, even though it is a governmental entity. 
Defining association as including a governmental entity creates an absurd result 
when that definition is applied to the code's definition of corporation. The code defines 
corporation as including association, Utah Code Ann, § 54-2-l(5)(a), but excludes 
governmental entities from the corporation subject to Commission jurisdiction. Utah 
Code Ann, § 54-2-l(5)(b). Thus, under RMP's analysis, the word "association" includes 
governmental entities when used in the definition of person but excludes governmental 
entities when used in the definition of corporation. This is an absurd result. 
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The proper construction is to exclude governmental entities from "association" 
where ever it is used. This is supported by the statutory exclusion of governmental 
entities from the definition of corporation and by the 1989 Amendment excluding 
governmental entities from the definition of person. 
RMP's argument conflicts with the code's definition of corporation in another 
way. Under RMP's argument, HLP is an association because three municipal 
corporations came together to create HLP. RMP Brief at 25. These municipal 
corporations are however excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction by the code's 
definition of corporation. It is absurd to suggest that these municipal corporations are 
excluded from Commission jurisdiction if they act individually, but are subject to the 
Commission jurisdiction if they merely come together for a common purpose. 
Finally, RMP's argument that HLP is an association conflicts with its proffered 
dictionary definition. To define the term "association," RMP selectively quotes Black's 
Law Dictionary as defining association as a "gathering of people for a common purpose; 
the persons so joined." RMP fails to include the more applicable definition of the term 
"association" in Black's Law Dictionary which states: "An unincorporated organization 
that is not a legal entity separate from the persons who compose it." This later definition 
would not include HLP which is a legal entity separate from its members. Thus, HLP is 
not an association. 
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(iii) HLP is Not a "Company." 
RMP offers a dictionary definition to define a "company," subject to Commission 
jurisdiction. Under RMP's definition, a "company" means "a corporation" or "less 
commonly, an association" that "carries on a commercial or industrial enterprise."3 Based 
on this definition, RMP concludes that HLP is a company because "HLP is an association 
or union of three municipalities organized for the 'commercial purpose' of providing 
electric service." RMP Brief at 24. RMP thus concludes that the Commission has 
jurisdiction over HLP. 
RMP's definition makes a "company" synonymous with both corporation and 
association. Thus, if HLP is a company, it is also a corporation and an association. As a 
corporation, the code excludes HLP, as a governmental entity, from Commission 
jurisdiction. It is absurd to suggest that HLP is subject to Commission jurisdiction if 
called a "company" and is excluded from Commission jurisdiction if called a 
"corporation." 
3
 Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edition, 2004) defines "company" as: 
1. A corporation — or, less commonly, an association, partnership, or 
union — that carries on a commercial or industrial enterprise. 2. A 
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, fund, or 
organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not, and (in an official 
capacity) any receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or similar official, or 
liquidating agent, for any of the foregoing. Investment Company Act § 
2(a)(8) (15 USCA § 80a-2(a)(8)). 
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RMP's interpretation of "association" and "company" to include governmental 
entities paints much too broadly. Every municipal electric utility is "organized for 'the 
commercial purpose9 of providing electric service to customers." RMP's Memorandum at 
6. As a result, RMP's interpretation would make every municipal electric utility a public 
utility subject to plenary Commission jurisdiction, regardless of where they provide 
service. This is an absurd and illogical result. Cf. RMP 's Memorandum at 2 ("There is 
no question that HLP's service to customers located within the municipal boundaries . . . 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.") The only way to avoid such an 
absurd and illogical result is to further rewrite the statute to limit the jurisdiction to 
governmental entities providing extraterritorial service. Nothing in the statutory language 
however supports this additional language. 
II. The Commission Erroneously Asserts Jurisdiction Based on Public Policy, 
Without a Statutory Grant of Jurisdiction. 
As discussed in HLP's opening brief, the Commission Order contains a number of 
errors. It is not necessary for HLP to repeat its earlier argument detailing how the 
Commission's Order violates the rulings of this Court as well as the Commission's own 
decisions. 
The Commission falls prey to these errors in its effort to justify its assertion of 
jurisdiction over governmental entities, absent a statute grant. Because there is no 
statutory grant of jurisdiction, the Commission is forced to find jurisdiction based on an 
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amalgam of "all the statutes governing interlocals and related statutes, those [statutes] 
governing Commission jurisdiction, and case law interpreting these statutes." 
Commission Order at 19 (R.34). Essentially, the Commission rewrites the utility code to 
give the Commission jurisdiction over a governmental entity, because the Commission 
believes that it is good public policy. 
The Commission cannot properly assert jurisdiction simply because it believes that 
it is a good idea. "Without clear statutory authority, the commission cannot pursue even 
worthy objectives for the public good." Mountain States Tel and Tel Co. v. Public 
Service Com % 754 P.2d 928, 933 (Utah 1988). It is however clear that the Commission 
Order is fueled by public policy considerations, without statutory authority. This is 
shown by its brief in this Court which discusses public policy concerns without reference 
to the statutory language. See, e.g., Commission Brief zt 23-25. Similarly, RMP describes 
"simple common sense" devoid of statutory support as "[o]ne of the strongest arguments" 
against HLP's arguments based on the statute's language. RMP Brief at 35-36. The 
Commission's jurisdiction however cannot be properly based on such policy arguments 
absent statutory support. 
III. The Commission's and RMP's Factual Claims, Not Supported By The 
Record, Must Be Disregarded. 
With respect to the issues raised by the Petition for Review, the parties are limited to the 
facts, supported by the record on appeal. The record on an appeal of a motion to dismiss 
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consists of the Complaint and Answer. In its motion to dismiss, HLP accepted as true the 
allegations of the Complaint, for the purposes of the motion only. Stated in different 
words, the Commission lacked jurisdiction over HLP, even if contrary to fact, the 
allegations of the Complaint were true. HLP retains the ability to prove the Complaint's 
factual allegations, false in the appropriate forum. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Commission and RMP seek to present the 
false impression that HLP has admitted to selling non-surplus power in violation of Utah 
law. Commission Brief at 6, 15, 18, and 28, RMP Brief at 7. HLP's Answer 
unambiguously states: 
HLP has for decades offered and continues to offer electrical 
services to customers located within its historical service 
areas who request such service, in full conformity with the 
Utah Municipal Code and all other applicable laws and 
principles of law and equity. 
Answer at 6. This allegation and others in the Answer make clear that HLP denies RMP's 
claim that it has violated the law by selling non-surplus electricity in violation of Utah 
law. 
In connection with the Petition for Review, the Commission's and RMP's briefs 
contain factual allegations, which are beyond the pleadings and thus not relevant to the 
issues here. Commission Brief at 8-9, RMP Brief at 5-6. These factual allegations, 
however, if left unchallenged, could be viewed as being accepted by HLP. The following 
briefly responds to these allegations. 
15 
RMP's Brief characterizes as "unfounded" HLP's claim that HLP has provided 
service to customers outside the municipal boundaries "because no other electric utility 
had the interest or facilities to provide service to customers scatter across the Heber 
Valley. RMP Brief dX 5.4 While it is true RMP has provided service to a few customers in 
the Heber Valley, it does not have the facilities to serve many of the customers located in 
or around HLP's service area. The vast majority of the customers served by RMP in the 
Heber area are located in the Timber Lakes subdivision and served over lines and using 
electricity provided by HLP. In fact, recently, a customer outside of HLP's service area 
requested service from HLP because RMP could not economically provide that service. 
HLP referred the customer to RMP to obtain service. 
As suggested by RMP's Brief, RMP had no capacity to provide service in the 
Heber Valley until construction of RMP's substation at Jordanelle, in 2005, which gave it 
some capacity to serve the north end of the Heber Valley. RMP Brief at 6, Answer at 2 (R. 
9). Prior to that time, "customers received service from the entity of their choice." RMP 
4
 In its Answer, HLP states: 
RMP has for many decades known of and encouraged HLP to 
provide electric service in the Heber Valley, including 
unincorporated areas of Wasatch County, and to make substantial 
expenditures for resources and facilities to provide this service. 
RMP is barred by abandonment, forfeiture, waiver, estoppel and 
laches from challenging HLP's authority to serve the Heber Valley, 
including unincorporated areas. 
Answer at 5 (R. 9). 
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Brief at 6. However, given RMP's lack of facilities, the customer's choice was service 
from HLP or no service at all. This choice continues today because of RMP's lack of 
facilities. 
The history of RMP's service to the Heber Valley illustrates the dilemma facing 
customers and HLP. RMP Brief at 6 From its creation in 1909, HLP was essentially "the 
only game in town," and RMP did not object to HLP's service area. RMP, however, 
sought to change the rules when, in 2005, the Jordanelle substation gave it some capacity 
to serve the north end of the Heber Valley. It was only then that RMP made any effort to 
serve within HLP's historic service area and then only to customers at the north end of the 
Heber Valley. It continues to lack the capacity to serve in the remainder of the Heber 
Valley. 
IV. The Commission Order Is Final Agency Action Subject to Judicial Review. 
"Final agency action" is an agency order that has "fully decided" an issue. Union 
Pacific R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2000 UT 40 f^ 13, 999 P.2d 17. Courts adopt a 
"pragmatic and flexible" approach in applying the term "final agency action" to a 
particular agency decision. Oregon Natural Desert Ass yn v. United States Forest Service, 
465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006). The court thus focuses on "the practical and legal 
effects" of the agency decision, and on the "effect of the action . . . not its label." Id. at 
982 and 985. 
Applying this standard in the instant case has been simplified by the Commission's 
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acknowledgment of this Court's jurisdiction to review the Commission Order as final 
agency action. Commission Brief 'at 1. The Commission thus acknowledges that it has 
"fully decided" the jurisdictional issue, that judicial review will not disrupt the orderly 
process of adjudication, and that the Commission Order is not a preliminary decision. 
Moreover, it confirms, as HLP argued, that the Commission Order has an immediate 
impact on HLP and its operations. 
While the Commission's acknowledgment does not create jurisdiction, the Court 
should carefully consider the acknowledgment in weighting the Union Pacific standard. 
Cf. Barker v. Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d 702 (Utah 1998)(Commission's 
treatment of own order as final agency action). This is particularly true, in the instant 
case, where the harm to HLP comes, in part, from the Commission's immediate 
application of its own order. Stated simply, the Commission apparently views its Order 
as having immediate impact, notwithstanding RMP's arguments to the contrary. 
It is not necessary to review in detail each of the Union Pacific elements which are 
discussed in detail in HLP's opening brief. These arguments are not repeated here. 
Instead, the discussion that follows addresses specific errors in RMP's analysis or 
supporting authorities. 
RMP cites Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency\ 699 F. 2d 
903 (3rd Cir. 1982) for the proposition that deferring judicial review fosters judicial 
economy. RMP Brief 'at 14. In Bethlehem, the agency action involved both legal and 
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factual issues. Id. at 909. With respect to the factual issues, the court deferred ruling to 
allow resolution of potentially dispositive factual issues. Id. However, with respect to 
purely legal questions, the court suggested a different approach: 
Despite the frequently reiterated benefits of exhaustion, courts have 
declined to require it when no purpose would be served by deferring 
review. For example, where a dispute centers on legal questions such as 
constitutional or statutory interpretation, and the facts are uncontested, then 
the interest in "full administrative fact gathering and utilization of agency 
expertise" is not harmed by earlier judicial scrutiny.... In those 
circumstances, a rigid exhaustion requirement would entail "a commitment 
of administrative resources unsupported by any administrative or judicial 
interest.55 
Id. at 907. The Bethlehem court did ultimately reach the issue of whether it should review 
the purely legal issue because another court had exclusive jurisdiction over that legal 
issue. Id. at 909. 
In the instant case, the Commission Order resolves a purely legal issue. It does not 
depend on the underlying facts. In other words, the Court deferring ruling would serve no 
useful purpose. 
RMP cites CEC Energy Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 891 F.2d 1077 (3rd 
Cir. 1989) for the proposition that the Commission Order is preliminary. In CEC Energy, 
the PSC determined that it had jurisdiction to investigate a contract between WAPA and 
CEC to determine its impact on WAPA ratepayers. Id. at 110. CEC claimed that the 
agency action injured it because the pending investigation made it difficult to obtain 
financing for the project contemplated by the contract. Id. at 1111. The court found that 
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this injury was not the type that justified immediate judicial review, because it was CEC's 
choice to move ahead with the project while the case was pending. Id. 
In CEC Energy, the agency jurisdictional ruling was limited to opening an 
investigative proceeding that had no independent legal effect other than that ordinarily 
associated with litigation. The Commission Order in the instant case does more than 
simply start litigation with its usual costs. It affects the very legal environment in which 
HLP operates. Before the Commission Order, the Commission had not claimed a right to 
regulate HLP under any circumstances. After the Commission Order, the Commission 
claimed the right to treat HLP as a public utility, and the Order was effective 
immediately. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-10(1). 
The Commission Order is a determination having immediate impact, justifying 
immediate review. When such agency action is involved, the affected party "need not 
wait until a threatened hardship becomes a reality" to obtain judicial review. CEC Energy 
at 1111. Instead, the affected party may obtain pre-enforcement judicial review. Id. 
Applying these principles, HLP may obtain immediate review of the Commission Order. 
V. Assuming Arguendo That the Commission Order Is Not Final Agency Action, 
the Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Order in Connection with the 
Issuance of an Extraordinary Writ. 
If the Court determines that the Commission Order is not final agency action, the 
Court should retain jurisdiction to review the Order in connection with the issuance of an 
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extraordinary writ. An extraordinary writ is the appropriate remedy where an agency 
exceeds its authority: 
The common law writ of certiorari was used when there was no adequate 
remedy at law, such as a direct statutory appeal, to bring the record of the 
proceedings of an inferior tribunal before a superior court to determine from 
the record whether the inferior tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to 
proceed in accordance with law. . . . The scope of the common law writ has 
been broadened not only to encompass questions of jurisdiction and 
regularity of proceedings, but also to correct" 'errors in law affecting the 
substantial rights of the parties.'" 
Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995). A writ is 
appropriate here because the Commission has exceeded its statutory jurisdiction. 
While the Commission does not oppose HLP's application for a writ, RMP 
opposes the application for many of the same reason it raises in its arguments on final 
agency action. Essentially, RMP claims the Order has no immediate affect and thus HLP 
suffers no irreparaole harm. The Commission Order however is immediately binding on 
HLP. In making this ruling, however, the Commission exceeded its authority by claiming 
a right to asset jurisdiction over HLP, as a "public utility," notwithstanding the absence of 
any statutory authority. The Commission does not deny that its Order has this immediate 
impact on HLP. 
Contrary to RMP's argument, this impact is not the same as a party simply being 
required to participate in ligation. The Commission Order gives the Commission 
jurisdiction to not only determine the extent of HLP's authority to serve, but to subject 
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HLP to the full range of public utility regulation. It is this later aspect of the Commission 
Order that makes this case unlike the ordinary challenge to jurisdiction. Unlike those 
cases, HLP injury is not limited to the specific issues in the litigation. HLP injury reaches 
beyond the immediate litigation to include regulation of all its extraterritorial operations. 
This latter risk is irreparable and not the typical risk of litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should reverse the Commission Order, because it 
asserts jurisdiction over a governmental entity, absent a statutory grant of jurisdiction and 
contrary to the Court's and the Commission's own precedent. 
Dated this ^ daY of July, 2009. 
- ^^j^/M^t/, 
^Joseph Tfuunbeck, Jr 
Gary A. Dodge 
Attorneys for Heber Light & Power 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on the 7th day of July, 2009,1 served a copy of the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER upon the parties listed below in this matter by mailing 
it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: 
Sander J. Mooy 
Utah Public Service Commission 
400 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Public Service Commission 
Mark C. Moench 
R. Jeff Richards 
Rocky Mountain Power 
201 South Main Street, Suite 2300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Rocky Mountain Power 
Michael Ginsberg 
Patricia E. Schmid 
Assistant Attorney Generals 
500 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Division of Public Utilities 
Paul H. Proctor 
Assistant Attorney General 
500 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Committee of Consumer 
Services 
Gregory B. Monson 
Ted D. Smith 
Stoel Rives LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Rocky Mountain Power 
Thomas Low 
Wasatch County Attorney 
805 West 100 South 
Heber City, UT 84032 
Attorney for Wasatch County 
Jodi S. Hoffman 
Hoffman Law 
P.O. Box 681333 
Park City, UT 84068 
Attorney for Town of Independence 
Michael R. Christensen 
JT Wasatch Commons, LC 
1165 E. Wilmington Ave., Suite 275 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Project Manager for JT Wasatch Commons 
23 
